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ARTICLE
CONTEXTUALIZING CLEBURNE
LAURA C. BORNSTEIN*

INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court decided City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,1 involving a zoning ordinance that discriminated against the “mentally retarded”2 in the establishment of group homes. Most legal experts criticized the opinion as
aberrant and unsound.3 A majority of the Court, represented by Justice
Byron White, held that mental retardation was not a suspect or quasisuspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,4 a conclusion that
seemed wrong to observers of the Court in light of the immutable nature
of mental retardation, the history of invidious discrimination against
mentally retarded persons, and the exclusion of the mentally retarded
from the political process.5 Moreover, it was unnecessary for the Court
*Policy Counsel/Women’s Law and Public Policy Fellow at the National Partnership for
Women & Families, Washington, D.C., 2010-2011; Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 2010,
cum laude; Rice University, B.A. 2006, summa cum laude. I wish to thank Victoria Nourse, a pioneer of legal “contextualization,” for inspiring this Article and providing feedback on early drafts. I
am also grateful to Bailey Bifoss and the staff of Golden Gate University Law Review for their editing work.
1
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
2
Although “intellectual disability” is now the preferred term for mental retardation in the
medical and advocacy communities, this Article will use the older nomenclature to maintain consistency with the Cleburne opinion.
3
See infra Part II.
4
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
5
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (listing the “traditional indicia of suspectness” in equal protection jurisprudence).
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to settle on a standard of review, because it proceeded to strike down the
application of the zoning ordinance under rational-basis review.6 The
Court could simply have stated that the city’s action failed even the lowest level of scrutiny, thus leaving for another case the question of
whether a higher level of scrutiny might be warranted for classifications
based on mental retardation. Finally, the Court’s decision to invalidate
the ordinance as applied was unusual for two reasons: first, because the
rational-relationship test is “typically so deferential as to amount to a virtual rubber stamp”7 on legislation, and second, because the Court had
never before employed the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate only a
particular application of a statute.8
The Court’s contortions in Cleburne were peculiar but not inexplicable. Precisely because the decision cannot be explained by reference
to established modes of equal protection analysis, one can assume that
the Justices of the majority were influenced by social and political factors. After summarizing the facts and opinions in the case and examining Cleburne’s reception in the legal world (in Parts I and II, respectively), Part III of this Article attempts to identify these external
variables. The mid-1980s were a high point of neighborhood hostility to
group homes for persons with mental retardation, and a low point of federal spending and enforcement efforts on behalf of the mentally retarded.
This social and political milieu, when met with Justice White’s unique
brand of judicial restraint, produced a decision that, while resolving the
immediate issue in favor of the group home residents, set a precedent
that reinforced the second-class status of persons with mental disabilities.
In conclusion, this Article assesses the long-term impact of the decision
and argues that the need to overturn Cleburne is still strong.
I.

THE CLEBURNE CASE

In 1980, Jan Hannah, the vice president and part owner of Cleburne
Living Center, Inc. (“CLC”), purchased a house in the city of Cleburne,
Texas.9 She intended to lease the house to CLC for use as a group home
for thirteen individuals with mild to moderate mental retardation.10 The
6
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. Contra Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1982) (“[I]f the
statutory scheme cannot pass even the [minimum rationality] test . . . we need not decide whether
any enhanced scrutiny is called for.”).
7
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56,
79 (1997).
8
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 476 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
9
Id. at 435 (majority opinion).
10
Id.
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zoning regulations applicable to the site allowed apartment buildings,
fraternity and sorority houses, and nursing homes.11 However, special
use permits, valid for one year at a time, were needed for the operation of
“[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholic or drug addicts,
or penal or correctional institutions.”12 The city of Cleburne determined
that the proposed group home should be classified as a “hospital for the
feeble-minded,” thus requiring CLC to apply for a special use permit.13
After holding a public hearing on CLC’s application, the city council
voted to deny a special use permit.14
CLC sued the city in federal district court, alleging that the zoning
ordinance was invalid both on its face and as applied because it discriminated against mentally retarded persons in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.15 The district court applied the minimum level of judicial
scrutiny available to equal protection claims and ruled that the ordinance
was rationally related to the city’s legitimate interests in “‘the safety and
fears of residents in the adjoining neighborhood,’ and the number of
people to be housed in the home.”16 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed.17 After considering the history of “unfair and often grotesque mistreatment” of mentally retarded persons, their lack of political
power, and the unalterable nature of mental retardation, the court determined that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification.18 The
court then held that the ordinance was invalid both on its face and as applied, because it did not substantially further any important governmental
interests.19
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, on July 1, 1985, unanimously struck down the ordinance as applied to the Cleburne group
home.20 A six-member majority of the Court, in an opinion written by
Justice White, held that the court of appeals erred in affording quasisuspect status to classifications based on mental retardation for four reasons.21 First, mentally retarded persons differ from the general population in a real and important respect because they “have a reduced ability
11

Id. at 436 n.3.
Id. at 436.
13
Id. at 436-37.
14
Id. at 437.
15
Id.
16
Id. (quoting the district court opinion).
17
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Tex., 726 F.2d 191, 202 (5th Cir. 1984),
rev’d, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
18
Id. at 197-98.
19
Id. at 200.
20
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432.
21
Id. at 442.
12
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to cope with and function in the everyday world.”22 Second, wrote Justice White, “the distinctive legislative response, both national and state,
to the plight of those who are mentally retarded demonstrates . . . that the
lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies
a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more
intrusive oversight by the judiciary.”23 Justice White pointed to Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Developmental Disabilities
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, the Education of the Handicapped Act,
and similar laws in the State of Texas as examples of such protective legislation.24 Third, Justice White asserted, this legislative response “negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless.”25
Finally, to deem mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification would
send the Court down a slippery slope to heightened scrutiny for, among
others, “the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm.”26
After explicitly declining to apply heightened scrutiny to the Cleburne ordinance, the majority inquired whether the city had a rational basis for requiring the group home to obtain a special use permit.27 Although the city was motivated by the negative attitudes of those who
owned property near the proposed group home and the fears of elderly
residents of the neighborhood, the majority held that the city had no legitimate interest in deferring to the unsubstantiated biases or fears of its
citizens.28 Likewise, the city could not legitimately deny a special use
permit based on its fear that students at the junior high school across the
street would harass the occupants of the group home.29 The city also
claimed to be worried about the home’s location on a flood plain, but
Justice White observed that a flood would equally affect a nursing home
or hospital, either of which could be established on the site of the proposed group home without a special use permit.30 Finally, the city expressed concern that the high occupancy of the group home might disturb
the serenity of the neighborhood and cause traffic congestion, fire hazards, and danger to other residents.31 However, the majority found that
denying a permit to the group home did not rationally further its interest
22

Id.
Id. at 443.
24
Id. at 443-44.
25
Id. at 445.
26
Id. at 445-46.
27
Id. at 448.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 449.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 449-50.
23
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in regulating population density, because a home containing the same
number of non-retarded occupants would be permitted under the zoning
ordinance.32 The majority concluded, therefore, that the city could only
have been motivated by “an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”33
Nevertheless, the majority declined to decide whether Cleburne’s
zoning ordinance facially violated the Equal Protection Clause. Maintaining that an as-applied ruling “is the preferred course of adjudication
since it enables courts to avoid making unnecessarily broad constitutional judgments,”34 the majority invalidated the application of the ordinance to the group home but allowed the ordinance to remain on the
books.35
In a concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens (joined by Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger) argued for a universal rational-basis standard
to replace the Court’s traditional tiered system of equal protection analysis.36 However, Justice Stevens agreed that the city of Cleburne had required CLC to obtain a special use permit “because of the irrational fears
of neighboring property owners, rather than for the protection of the
mentally retarded persons who would reside in [the group] home.”37
Thus, he joined the majority in holding that Cleburne’s ordinance was
invalid as applied.38
Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for himself and Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in
part.39 He opined that the majority’s explicit rejection of heightened
scrutiny was “wholly superfluous to the decision of this case” because
the majority found rational-basis review sufficient to invalidate the city’s
action.40 Moreover, Justice Marshall questioned whether the majority
actually applied a minimum level of scrutiny as it claimed.41 Instead of
presuming that the ordinance was constitutional, as is traditionally the
case with minimal scrutiny,42 the majority presumed just the opposite and
32

Id.
Id. at 450.
34
Id. at 447.
35
Id. at 450.
36
Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37
Id. at 455.
38
Id.
39
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
40
Id. at 456.
41
Id.
42
See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“Unless a classification trammels
fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions . . . our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification
33
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then found the city’s proffered justifications “difficult to believe.”43 Additionally, the majority implied that the city could not take “one step at a
time” to regulate population density, as is usually permitted under the rational-basis test.44 Justice Marshall termed this approach “‘second order’
rational-basis review” and criticized the majority for failing to provide
guidance to the lower courts as to which level of rational-basis review to
apply in a given case.45
Justice Marshall contended that a zoning ordinance that classifies on
the basis of mental retardation should be subject to intermediate-level
scrutiny for two reasons. First, the interest of the mentally retarded in
establishing group homes is significant because group homes are the
primary means by which mentally retarded persons can fully participate
in the community at large.46 Second, “the mentally retarded have been
subject to a lengthy and tragic history of segregation and discrimination,”47 including such horrors as warehousing and sterilization.48 Indeed, noted Justice Marshall, archaic and narrow-minded laws  including the one at issue in this case49  remained on the books in many
states.50
Justice Marshall criticized the majority’s reasoning in concluding
that mental retardation was not a quasi-suspect classification.51 He rejected the notion that a recent increase in legislative initiatives that benefited the mentally retarded should preclude the application of heightened
scrutiny to such classifications.52 Legislatures had grown more enlightened in their treatment of African Americans too, and yet the Court still
regarded race-based distinctions as suspect.53 Furthermore, Justice Marshall observed, the mere fact that governments sometimes have a valid
reason to classify on the basis of mental retardation did not mean that the
courts must apply rational-basis review to every such classification:
“Heightened but not strict scrutiny is considered appropriate in areas
such as gender, illegitimacy, or alienage because the Court views the trait

challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
43
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 459 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
44
Id. at 458.
45
Id. at 460.
46
Id. at 461.
47
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
48
Id. at 462-63.
49
Id. at 464 n.17.
50
Id. at 467.
51
See id. at 472-73.
52
Id. at 465-67.
53
Id.
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as relevant under some circumstances but not others.”54
Finally, Justice Marshall expressed his disapproval of the majority’s
decision to strike down the ordinance on an as-applied basis, an unprecedented maneuver in the equal protection context.55 According to Justice
Marshall, “If a discriminatory purpose infects a legislative Act, the Act
itself is inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause and cannot validly
be applied to anyone.”56 Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun were
not alone in their condemnation of the Cleburne majority opinion.
II.

REACTIONS TO CLEBURNE

Disability rights advocates praised the Court’s result,57 but members
of the legal community immediately panned its reasoning. One commentator wrote, “The Court made only a feeble attempt to argue that
mental retardation does not meet the traditional indicia of suspectness.”58
He and others believed that the Court should have explicitly applied intermediate-level scrutiny to the zoning ordinance for a number of reasons. Echoing Justice Marshall’s dissent, they argued that legislative initiatives benefiting the mentally retarded should not preclude heightened
scrutiny; women and racial minorities receive special protection from the
courts despite the passage of laws intended to benefit them.59 The Harvard Law Review Association maintained that the Court’s focus on remedial legislative action was dangerous because “[l]egislative reforms
may prove short-lived, and even well-intentioned legislation can be mis-

54

Id. at 469.
Id. at 476.
56
Id. at 477 n.25.
57
A lawyer with the Washington-based Mental Health Law Project (now known as the
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law) said that the ruling would “make it easier to establish group
homes in cities.” Court Builds Higher Church-State Wall, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 15,
1985, at 11. The supervising attorney for Advocacy, Inc., of Austin, Texas, said, “We're very
pleased, of course, that the justices have given out the message that the retarded aren't second-class
citizens and can't be pushed aside into industrial areas of the city.” Philip Hager, Justices Refuse to
Extend Bias Safeguard to Retarded, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1985, at 1. Jan Hannah herself greeted the
decision as a victory, stating, “I’m about to float out of the atmosphere.” David Hanners, Home’s
Co-Owner Rejoices, DALL. MORNING NEWS, July 2, 1985, at A11.
58
James W. Ellis, On the “Usefulness” of Suspect Classifications, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 375,
376-77 (1986).
59
Id. at 380; J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—Mental
Retardation Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification; Therefore, Classifications on That Basis Are
Subject to Rational Basis Limitations, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1074 (1986); Harvard Law Review
Ass’n, Discrimination Against the Mentally Retarded, 99 HARV. L. REV. 161, 168 (1985); Mark V.
Wunder, Comment, Equal Protection and the Mentally Retarded: A Denial of Quasi-Suspect Status
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 72 IOWA L. REV. 241, 251 (1986).
55
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applied.”60 Commentators were also troubled by the majority’s conclusion that the mentally retarded had political power.61 After all, persons
with mental retardation were still ineligible to vote in twenty-six states as
of 1979.62 Moreover, prejudice toward the mentally retarded was still
very much alive, as evidenced by widespread community resistance to
the establishment of group homes.63 To these commentators, the Court’s
pronouncement that the immutability of a group’s defining characteristic
was irrelevant to a determination of suspectness seemed to fly in the face
of its earlier decisions.64 Finally, they asserted, the denial of an important right (freedom to establish a home) should have justified the use of a

60
Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Discrimination Against the Mentally Retarded, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 161, 168 (1985).
61
Marie Appleby, The Mentally Retarded: The Need for Intermediate Scrutiny, 7 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 109, 110 (1987); James W. Ellis, On the “Usefulness” of Suspect Classifications, 3
CONST. COMMENT. 375, 379 (1986); J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—Mental Retardation Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification; Therefore, Classifications on
That Basis Are Subject to Rational Basis Limitations, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1075 (1986); Gayle
Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND.
L.J. 779, 793 (1987); Mark V. Wunder, Comment, Equal Protection and the Mentally Retarded: A
Denial of Quasi-Suspect Status in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 72 IOWA L. REV.
241, 251-52 (1986).
62
Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644, 1645-46, n.10 (1979)
(“States that refer to idiots or insane persons include: Alabama (ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182); Arkansas (ARK. CONST. art. 3, § 5); Delaware (DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2); Georgia (GA. CONST. art. II, §
2, para. 1); Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3); Iowa (IOWA CONST. art. 2, § 5); Kentucky (KY.
CONST. § 145); Mississippi (MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241); Nevada (NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1); New
Jersey (N.J. CONST. art. II, para. 6); New Mexico (N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1); Ohio (OHIO CONST.
art. V, § 6); Texas (TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1); Washington (WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3); Wyoming
(WYO. CONST. art. 6, § 6). States that refer to persons non compos[ ]mentis or mentally diseased
include: Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2); Arizona (ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (non compos[
]mentis or insane)); Hawaii (HAWAII CONST. art. II, §2); Minnesota (MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1;
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 200.02(25)(b) (West Supp/1978)); Montana (MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2); Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 2); North Dakota (N.D. CONST. § 127 (non compos[ ]mentis or insane)); Oregon (OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (idiot or mentally diseased)); Rhode Island (R.I. CONST.
amend. 38, § 1); West Virginia (W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1); Wisconsin (WIS. CONST. art. Ill, § 2
(non compos[ ]mentis or insane)).”)
63
James W. Ellis, On the “Usefulness” of Suspect Classifications, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 375,
380 (1986); Mark V. Wunder, Comment, Equal Protection and the Mentally Retarded: A Denial of
Quasi-Suspect Status in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 72 IOWA L. REV. 241, 250
(1986).
64
Marie Appleby, The Mentally Retarded: The Need for Intermediate Scrutiny, 7 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 109, 110 (1987); James W. Ellis, On the “Usefulness” of Suspect Classifications, 3
CONST. COMMENT. 375, 379 (1986); J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—Mental Retardation Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification; Therefore, Classifications on
That Basis Are Subject to Rational Basis Limitations, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1073 (1986); Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Discrimination Against the Mentally Retarded, 99 HARV. L. REV. 161, 167
(1985); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793 (1987).
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heightened level of scrutiny.65
Like Justice Marshall, observers in the legal community argued that
the majority’s unnecessary holding as to the proper standard of review
contravened the Court’s established preference for deciding constitutional cases on the narrowest possible ground.66 They also condemned
the Court for claiming to use rational-basis review while actually scrutinizing the city’s action more searchingly.67 The majority’s disingenuousness, commentators feared, would lead to doctrinal confusion among
the lower courts.68 Additionally, many observers criticized the majority
for departing from equal protection precedent by striking down a law
only as applied.69
III. EXPLAINING CLEBURNE
If the majority opinion in Cleburne was immediately criticized as
inconsistent with equal protection jurisprudence, then how can it be explained? This Article proposes that the majority’s deviation from timehonored principles of constitutional decision making can be attributed to
three interrelated factors. First, the Court decided Cleburne during a period of widespread and open animosity to the establishment of group
homes for the mentally retarded, a phenomenon often referred to as “not
65

Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793 (1987); Mark V. Wunder, Comment, Equal Protection and the Mentally
Retarded: A Denial of Quasi-Suspect Status in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 72 IOWA
L. REV. 241, 248-49 (1986).
66
James W. Ellis, On the “Usefulness” of Suspect Classifications, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 375,
382 (1986); J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—Mental Retardation Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1070 (1986).
67
Marie Appleby, The Mentally Retarded: The Need for Intermediate Scrutiny, 7 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 109, 131 (1987); J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—
Mental Retardation Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification; Therefore, Classifications on That Basis
Are Subject to Rational Basis Limitations, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1079-83 (1986); Gayle Lynn
Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J.
779, 801 (1987).
68
Marie Appleby, The Mentally Retarded: The Need for Intermediate Scrutiny, 7 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 109, 131 (1987); J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—
Mental Retardation Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification; Therefore, Classifications on That Basis
Are Subject to Rational Basis Limitations, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1079-83 (1986); Gayle Lynn
Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J.
779, 801 (1987).
69
J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—Mental Retardation
Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification; Therefore, Classifications on That Basis Are Subject to Rational Basis Limitations, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1076-79 (1986); Harvard Law Review Ass’n,
Discrimination Against the Mentally Retarded, 99 HARV. L. REV. 161, 170-71 (1985); John D. Wilson, Cleburne: An Evolutionary Step in Equal Protection Analysis, 46 MD. L. REV. 163, 188-89
(1986).
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in my back yard,” or “NIMBY.”70 Second, the Court was also influenced
by the political stance of the Reagan Administration, which was one of
indifference to the needs of the mentally retarded and other disabled individuals. Third, the decision was written by Justice White, whose opinions revealed an idiosyncratic attachment to the rational-basis test.
A.

NEIGHBORHOOD OPPOSITION

The 1970s and 1980s saw a flurry of court orders requiring states to
close down their mental institutions and integrate their mentally retarded
citizens into society at large.71 Yet many Americans abhorred the prospect of sharing their neighborhoods with mentally retarded persons.72
This section describes the measures to which residents of states such as
New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Texas resorted to prevent group
homes from opening in their communities. The lingering prejudices of
the American populace evidenced in these stories might have induced the
Court, ever cautious of outpacing public opinion, to refuse quasi-suspect
status to classifications based on mental retardation.
Beginning in the 1920s, states built massive facilities to house the
mentally retarded — or, more accurately, to protect society from the promiscuous and criminal impulses that mentally retarded persons were
thought to exhibit.73 These facilities were generally overcrowded, understaffed, unhygienic, devoid of intellectual stimulation, and rife with
physical and emotional abuse.74 Because the goal was to detain the mentally retarded for life, states saw no reason to treat them humanely or develop their capabilities.75
In the 1970s, a wave of class action lawsuits and pressure from disability rights groups exposed the horrendous conditions in which institutionalized mentally retarded persons lived.76 Over the next decade, ad70
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERSONS
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT FOR LEGISLATORS 28
(2000), available at http://www.mnddc.org/parallels2/pdf/00s/00/00-DPD-NCS.pdf.
71
See Joann S. Lublin, Group Homes That Serve the Mentally Ill Face New Barriers in Some
Communities, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1986, at 1; Samuel Jan Brakel, Involuntary Institutionalization,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 47 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985).
72
See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF ZONING AND OTHER
PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUP HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED 9-10
(1983), available at http://archive.gao.gov/f0102/122220.pdf.
73
ISSAM B. AMARY, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED-DEVELOPMENTALLY
DISABLED TO TREATMENT AND EDUCATION 6 (1980).
74
Id.
75
See id.
76
Id. at 8-9; Barbara A. Weiner, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW 251, 251 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985).

WITH
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vocates for the mentally retarded brought legal challenges seeking at first
to reform these public institutions, and later to replace institutionalized
care with community-based services.77 Approximately two thirds of the
nation’s institutionalized mentally ill and retarded patients were released
into the community during the 1970s, usually by court order,78 and the
number of group homes for the mentally retarded multiplied by ten.79 In
1975, the Governor of New York signed a consent decree that required
the state to relocate the 5,323 residents of Willowbrook State School for
the Mentally Retarded to neighborhood group homes at the rate of fifty
people per month.80 Pursuant to a similar consent decree approved in
1977, Massachusetts reassigned 850 mentally retarded individuals from
state schools to community residences.81 In 1978, a court in Washington,
D.C., ordered the city to release at least 100 residents per year from its
1,300-bed facility for the mentally retarded.82
The pace of deinstitutionalization was often slower than anticipated,
largely due to fierce resistance from neighborhood residents and local
governments.83 However, the transfer of mentally retarded persons out
of institutions was somewhat hastened by the economic recession in the
early 1980s; community-based care cost states less than institutional
77

ISSAM B. AMARY, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED-DEVELOPMENTALLY
DISABLED TO TREATMENT AND EDUCATION 8-9 (1980); Samuel Jan Brakel, Involuntary Institutionalization, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 21, 21-23, 40 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds.,
3d ed. 1985). By 1983, litigation concerning the operations of public institutions for the mentally
retarded had been filed in at least thirty-two states. STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR
RETARDED PEOPLE 5 (1983).
78
Joann S. Lublin, Group Homes That Serve the Mentally Ill Face New Barriers in Some
Communities, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1986, at 1; see also Samuel Jan Brakel, Involuntary Institutionalization, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 47 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed.
1985) (reporting that the number of patients in public mental institutions dropped from 551 in 1956
to 153 in 1978).
79
Researchers counted 611 community residential facilities for persons with mental retardation in 1972-74 and as many as 6,300 in 1982. MATTHEW P. JANICKI ET AL., A REPORT ON THE
AVAILABILITY OF GROUP HOMES FOR PERSONS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 10 (1982), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED231157.pdf.
80
Robert Keating, The War Against the Mentally Retarded, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 17, 1979, at
89-90 (noting that at the time, Willowbrook was the world’s largest residential institution for the
mentally retarded); see also STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 41
(1983).
81
Jean Dietz, Families Object to Plans for Handicapped, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1985, at
26.
82
Patrice Gaines-Carter, Group-Home Bill Emotionally Debated, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,
1986, at D3; John Purnell, District’s Home for Retarded Finally Is Closed, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29,
1991, at A11.
83
David Kirkwood, Home Sites for the Retarded Still Raise Fears, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
1979, at WC16 (noting that only four years after the Willowbrook consent decree was entered, deinstitutionalization in New York was already behind schedule); see also Robert Keating, The War
Against the Mentally Retarded, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 17, 1979, at 90.
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care.84 Some states, like Michigan, voluntarily began to close down their
state institutions during that period,85 and class actions that had been
filed against institutions in the 1970s continued to be resolved in favor of
the patients.86 Therefore, even though several court orders that mandated
deinstitutionalization were handed down in the late 1970s, the zenith of
community integration of mentally retarded individuals — and opposition thereto — occurred in the 1980s, when Cleburne was decided.
A 1983 report issued by the U.S. General Accounting Office87
found that 37% of group home sponsors who participated in public hearings relating to establishment of their group homes faced considerable
resistance from community members.88 The most common objections
raised by these opponents concerned dangerous or unusual behavior of
group home residents, declining real estate value, and an increase in
automobile traffic.89 The same percentage of group homes prompted
community complaints after opening; again, these complaints usually related to the perceived dangerous or unusual behavior of the residents.90
The U.S. General Accounting Office also concluded that state preemptive zoning laws, which prohibited localities from excluding group
homes from residential areas, actually increased community opposition

84

NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERSONS
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT FOR LEGISLATORS 13-14
(2000), available at http://www.mnddc.org/parallels2/pdf/00s/00/00-DPD-NCS.pdf; NEW YORK
STATE COMMISSION ON QUALITY OF CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED, WILLOWBROOK: FROM
INSTITUTION TO THE COMMUNITY; A FISCAL AND PROGRAMMATIC REVIEW OF SELECTED
COMMUNITY RESIDENCES IN NEW YORK CITY 75 (1982).
85
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERSONS
WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT FOR LEGISLATORS 17
(2000), available at http://www.mnddc.org/parallels2/pdf/00s/00/00-DPD-NCS.pdf.
86
In 1984, Pennsylvania settled a case brought by residents of the Pennhurst Center for the
mentally retarded, agreeing to close the institution within two years. Accord in Suit Ends 11 Years
of Dispute over the Retarded, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1985. Pennhurst had been plagued for years by
allegations of neglect, forced labor, and physical assault. William Robbins, Center for Retarded Still
Enmeshed in Legal Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1981; Workers Indicted in Patient Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1983. In a 1985 consent decree, Maryland promised to increase community residential placements for the mentally retarded threefold. Brief for the State of Md. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(No. 84-468). A 1987 settlement in Minnesota required the state to reduce the number of mentally
retarded people in its regional centers to two hundred. M. L. Smith, Court’s Jurisdiction over Retarded Ends, STAR TRIB., Aug. 26, 1989, at 01A.
87
This agency is now known as the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
88
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF ZONING AND OTHER PROBLEMS
AFFECTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUP HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED 9-10 (1983),
available at http://archive.gao.gov/f0102/122220.pdf.
89
Id. at 10.
90
Id.
WITH
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to group homes, especially in suburban areas.91
The difficulties that New York encountered in attempting to place
Willowbrook residents in community-based housing are instructive. In
1980, when the state reached an agreement to buy a house in Rockville
Centre to accommodate mentally retarded individuals, eighteen
neighbors formed a company “whose sole purpose was to buy the house
and sell it to anyone but the state.”92 The state had to seek an order
against the company in federal court before it could establish the group
home.93
In 1981, New York State tried to purchase a house for use as a
group home in an upper-middle-class community in the Five Towns area;
however, the owner refused to sell it to the state and ultimately took it off
the market.94 A county official said that establishing a group home was
“like pulling teeth — with few exceptions, every community does not
want these homes.”95 The state’s two previous attempts to purchase
houses in the Five Towns had failed because of resistance from the owners as well as the communities at large.96
Also in 1981, the town of Pound Ridge, New York, successfully
challenged the placement of a community residence for six developmentally disabled young adults.97 The Town Supervisor stated, “We would
like not to have any group homes in Pound Ridge. But if we have to
have [one] . . . we would rather have it in a place where it would not offend people.”98 The town proposed to relocate the group home from
“one of the finer neighborhoods” to an infrequently traveled dirt road on
the outskirts of Pound Ridge.99 Residents of that fine neighborhood had
been making obscene phone calls to the group home, yelling profanities
from their cars, and throwing beer cans at the house.100 However, the
91

Id. at 24-25.
Phyllis Bernstein, Home for Retarded Stirs Cedarhurst, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1981, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/19/nyregion/home-for-retarded-stirs-cedarhurst.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
93
Judge Orders Sale of House to State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1981.
94
Phyllis Bernstein, Home for Retarded Stirs Cedarhurst, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1981, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/19/nyregion/home-for-retarded-stirs-cedarhurst.html (internal quotation marks omitted); Long Island Journal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1981.
95
Phyllis Bernstein, Home for Retarded Stirs Cedarhurst, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1981, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/19/nyregion/home-for-retarded-stirs-cedarhurst.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
96
Id.
97
J. B. O’Mahoney, Pound Ridge Group Home in Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1981, at
A1.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
92
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community reaction could have been even worse: elsewhere in New
York, property owners who planned to sell their houses for use as group
homes, board members voting to approve group homes, and their family
members received death threats, bomb threats, broken windows, and brutal beatings.101
New York was not the only state whose communities were inhospitable to the mentally retarded. In 1982, the citizens of New Providence,
New Jersey, rallied against a plan to open a group home by organizing
meetings, signing petitions, and writing letters to local, state, and federal
officials.102 Like the inhabitants of Rockville Centre, they tried to buy
the house before the group-home organization could finalize the deal.103
Neighbors protested that the home would “destroy the character of the
neighborhood” and diminish the values of their properties.104 While conceding that the home “may be good for the retarded people,” they argued
that it should not be located “in a nice neighborhood like this.”105
Arson was a common tactic used by particularly virulent opponents
of group homes for the mentally retarded. In 1978, someone entered a
soon-to-open group home in Huntington, Long Island, poured gasoline
throughout the first floor, and set the house on fire.106 In 1985, arsonists
burned down a group home for the mentally retarded near Tallahassee,
Florida, shortly before it was scheduled to open.107 About a month before the fire, sixty neighborhood residents had met with county officials
to express fears that the group home would lower property values and
that the occupants would be dangerous.108 After the fire, one neighborhood resident said, “Just because the building burned doesn’t mean the
fight is over.”109 In 1989, in the same Five Towns area of New York
whose communities had resisted group homes earlier in the decade, a
group home being prepared for mentally retarded adults was set
ablaze.110
101

87-88.

Robert Keating, The War Against the Mentally Retarded, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 17, 1979, at

102
Housing
a
Home,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
2,
1982,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/02/nyregion/housing-a-home.html.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Robert Keating, The War Against the Mentally Retarded, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 17, 1979, at
87-88.
107
Bill Kaczor, Florida Drops Plans for AIDS Group Home, GAINESVILLE SUN, Nov. 7,
1987, at 5B; Reward Offered for Arsonist, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Jan. 30, 1985, at 9B.
108
Reward Offered for Arsonist, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Jan. 30, 1985, at 9B.
109
Id.
110
Michael Winerip, L.I. Police Suspect Arson in Blaze at Site of a Proposed Group Home,
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Newspaper accounts of the fight over the Cleburne home tell a similar story of ignorance and prejudice. During the public hearing on
CLC’s special use permit application, one Cleburne resident told the
Cleburne Planning and Zoning Commission, “It’s not a very pleasant
thought to go to bed and know there’s thirteen demented, self-afflicted
people across the street from you.”111 A dentist with a nearby office presented the commission with a petition signed by twenty-nine families
opposed to the group home.112 The principal of Cleburne Junior High
School, located across the street from the proposed group home, claimed
to be worried about the way his seventh- and eighth-graders might treat
the residents of the home.113 He acknowledged that the group home was
needed but wondered, “Is it needed at this site?”114 A 65-year-old man
who lived three doors away told the Associated Press:
The older women are fearful of this thing. There are a lot of older
women in this neighborhood and they don’t want these people around.
If these people get by with this, all cities might as well do away with
their laws. We’ve lived here all our lives and I don’t know why we
should be subjected to this. With retarded people, you don’t ever
115
know when they’re going to do something.

All told, a majority of property owners within 200 feet of the group home
requested that the City Council deny CLC a special use permit.116 Even
as the city denied discriminating against the mentally retarded,117 it justified its actions by arguing that “the mentally retarded by definition possess significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning which exists concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior,” and that “[t]hese
unique characteristics . . . affect the health, safety and general welfare” of
“surrounding neighbors” in unspecified ways.118
Many legal scholars and political scientists have observed that Su-

N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1989, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/22/nyregion/li-policesuspect-arson-in-blaze-at-site-of-a-proposed-group-home.html.
111
Richard Carelli, Texas Town Divided over Proposed Group Home, DAILY NEWS
(BOWLING GREEN, KY.), May 5, 1985, at 23-B.
112
Id.
113
Court to Rule on Texas Zoning Ban for Retarded, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1984, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/27/us/court-to-rule-on-texas-zoning-ban-for-retarded.html.
114
Id.
115
Decision May Settle Disputes, ROME NEWS-TRIB., Nov. 21, 1984, at 22-E.
116
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 9, City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (No. 84-468).
117
Id. at 5.
118
Id. at 5-6.
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preme Court decisions generally align with popular opinion.119 In Professor Barry Friedman’s words, “The Justices live on this planet and
typically are aware of what happens on it.”120 Public opinion of the mentally retarded had certainly improved by the 1980s — few advocated
forced sterilization, for instance — but antiquated notions of mentally
retarded persons as dangerous, unpredictable, and unsightly persisted in
the American consciousness. Perhaps it should not be surprising, therefore, that the Cleburne majority, even as it frowned upon the “irrational
prejudice” of the citizens of Cleburne, went out of its way to hold that
mentally retarded individuals did not deserve special consideration under
the Equal Protection Clause and left the city’s discriminatory zoning ordinance on the books. The opinion, with a wink and a nudge, invited
Cleburne and other cities to continue to exclude mentally retarded persons from respectable neighborhoods, so long as they did this by applying more cleverly constructed ordinances in a more subtle way. Just as
Americans were not ready to let mentally retarded persons move in next
door, the Justices in the majority were not ready to extend to mentally
retarded persons the constitutional status they deserved.
B.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

Through the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government was increasingly attentive to the problems facing mentally retarded Americans.121
When Ronald Reagan became president, however, his Administration
radically reduced federal funding for programs and services for the mentally retarded and abandoned its duty to enforce disability rights laws.122
119

See Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1294-95 (2004); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The
Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public
Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1019-21 (2004); Robert F. Nagel, Limiting the Court by Limiting Life
Tenure, in REFORMING THE COURT 131 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006);
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006).
120
Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 325 (2005).
121
See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR
NATIONAL ACTION TO COMBAT MENTAL RETARDATION 201 (1962); Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, § 3 (1975); The Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486, § 113 (1975); The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, § 504 (1973); Pub. L. No. 92-223, 85 Stat. 802
(1971).
122
See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64
TEMP. L. REV. 393, 396 n.20 (1991) (“The federal government's virtual abdication of administrative
enforcement efforts for disability rights is well-documented, both in congressional hearings and in
scholarly articles. See, e.g., [Robert D. Dinerstein,] The Absence of Justice, 63 NEB. L. REV. 680
(1984) (during Reagan Administration, historic position of Justice Department as protector of rights
of institutionalized persons eroded substantially).”).
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Furthermore, the Reagan Administration explicitly urged the Court in
Cleburne to apply only rational-basis review.123 It is likely that the executive’s disregard for the special needs of persons with mental retardation helped spur the Court to grant deference to legislative action discriminating against those persons.
Federal action in the field of mental retardation and developmental
disabilities proliferated beginning in 1961 with the establishment of the
President’s Panel on Mental Retardation.124 The panel consisted of
twenty-seven physicians, scientists, educators, lawyers, and consumers,
tasked by President John F. Kennedy with charting a “comprehensive
and coordinated attack on the problem of mental retardation.”125 Many
of the panel’s recommendations were enacted into law in 1963126 as part
of the Maternal and Child Health and Mental Retardation Planning
Amendments127 and the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community
Mental Health Centers Construction Act.128 These and other federal initiatives funded institutions around the country that agreed to comply with
a set of guidelines designed to raise the quality of education and treatment provided to mentally retarded persons housed in their facilities.129
In the 1970s, Congress enacted laws to reimburse state intermediate-care
facilities that provided “active treatment” to the mentally retarded;130 to
prohibit disability discrimination by federal agencies, federal contractors,
and programs receiving federal financial assistance;131 to subsidize state
“protection and advocacy” programs for the developmentally disabled
and mentally retarded;132 and to require all federally funded public
schools to provide equal access to education for disabled children.133
123
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, City of Cleburne, Tex.
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (No. 84-468).
124
PRESIDENT’S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL
ACTION TO COMBAT MENTAL RETARDATION 201 (1962).
125
Id.; see also DAVID BRADDOCK, FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD MENTAL RETARDATION AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 17 (1987).
126
David L. Braddock & Susan L. Parish, An Institutional History of Disability, in
HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 11, 46 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001).
127
Maternal and Child Health and Mental Retardation Planning Amendments of 1963, Pub.
L. No. 88-156, 77 Stat. 273 (1963).
128
Mental Retardation Facilities Construction Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282
(1963).
129
ISSAM B. AMARY, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED-DEVELOPMENTALLY
DISABLED TO TREATMENT AND EDUCATION vii (1980).
130
Pub. L. No. 92-223, 85 Stat. 802 (1971).
131
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, § 504 (1973).
132
The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89
Stat. 486, § 113 (1975).
133
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, §
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In 1981, however, President Reagan took office, announcing in his
first inaugural address that he intended “to curb the size and influence of
the Federal establishment.”134 By the “Federal establishment,” he meant
not the military (defense spending increased by 40% during his two
terms in office)135 but rather entitlement programs and social services,
including those that catered to the mentally retarded. The President immediately launched a multipronged campaign to restrict federal financial
support for mental retardation programs and services. His first budget136
called for large multipurpose block grants, which offered the states more
flexible administration but less money in the areas of social services,
health care, and mental health.137 During President Reagan’s first term,
federal spending on special education,138 special recreation,139 intermediate-care facilities,140 the training of mental retardation personnel,141 and
income maintenance for mentally retarded persons142 stagnated or declined. Whereas total federal funding for services for the mentally retarded had increased at an average rate of 15.5% per year from fiscal
year (“FY”) 1972 to FY 1980,143 it actually decreased in practical terms
every year between FY 1981 and FY 1985, after taking inflation into ac3 (1975).

134

President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/124/ pres61.html.
135
Greg Schneider and Renae Merle, Reagan’s Defense Buildup Bridged Military Eras,
WASH. POST, June 9, 2004, at E01.
136
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
137
DAVID BRADDOCK, FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD MENTAL RETARDATION AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 26 (1987).
138
In real economic terms, federal assistance for special education for mentally retarded children “peaked in FY [fiscal year] 1980 and fell steadily every year thereafter through FY 1985.” Id.
at 39.
139
The Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955, § 305 (1978) (authorized grants to state agencies
and to public or nonprofit organizations for the development of programs to provide disabled individuals with recreational activities to improve their mobility and socialization). The Reagan Administration, however, did not request any funding for this program from FY 1981 to FY 1984.
DAVID BRADDOCK, FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 119 (1987).
140
From FY 1982 to FY 1985, real growth in intermediate-care facility reimbursements averaged only 1.4% annually, compared with over 56% annually between FY 1972 and FY 1981.
DAVID BRADDOCK, FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 57, 59 (1987).
141
From FY 1980 to FY 1983, federal support for the training of personnel in mental retardation fell 17%. Adjusted FY 1984-85 funding levels “represented the smallest spending commitment
for training in 22 years.” Id.
142
The rate of growth in federal income maintenance spending for persons with mental retardation averaged 34% per year in the 1950s, 12% per year in the 1960s, 10% per year in the 1970s,
and only 2.2% per year during the first half of the 1980s. Id. at 133.
143
Id. at 32.
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count.144 In FY 1982, the percentage of the federal government’s total
annual budget devoted to financing mental-retardation-related activities
fell for the first time in thirty years.145 Moreover, a disproportionately
large share of federal spending for the mentally retarded went toward the
relatively small proportion of mentally retarded persons living in staterun institutions.146
Meanwhile, President Reagan’s policy of deregulation led to a “virtual abdication of administrative enforcement efforts for disability
rights.”147 The Reagan Administration asserted, at a time when states
were still consigning mentally retarded persons to unnecessarily restrictive institutional settings without due process, that “federal regulatory
and judicial roles [could] safely recede because states already provide[d]
adequate legal protection for their needy citizens.”148 Accordingly, the
President established a Task Force for Regulatory Relief and instructed it
to “dismantle such administrative monstrosities as affirmative action” for
disabled federal employees and contractors.149 Administration officials
not only proposed a drastic curtailment of the federal government’s functions in implementing the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975,150 but also attempted to dilute equal-access provisions of other
laws relating to health and social services, recreational programs, employment, and program accessibility.151
Additionally, President Reagan sought to eradicate the Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”),152 the federally operated legal aid organization, which was under a congressional mandate to provide “priority service” to persons with disabilities.153 When his effort to destroy the LSC
failed, he slashed funding for it and appointed a board of directors who
144

See
Inflation
Data,
Historical
U.S.
Inflation
Rate
1914-Present,
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/HistoricalInflation.aspx?dsInflation_currentPage=2
(last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
145
DAVID BRADDOCK, FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD MENTAL RETARDATION AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 57, 181-82 (1987).
146
Id. at 183.
147
Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64
TEMP. L. REV. 393, 396 n.20 (1991).
148
STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 78 (1983).
149
Edward D. Berkowitz, A Historical Preface to the Americans with Disabilities Act, in
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 96, 107-08 (Hugh Davis Graham ed., 1994).
150
Otis H. Stephens, Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and the Disabled, in THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 157, 166 (Tinsley E. Yarbrough ed., 1985).
151
STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 169-70 (1983).
152
Kimberly McKelvey, Comment, Public Interest Lawyering in the United States and Montana: Past, Present and Future, 67 MONT. L. REV. 337, 344 (2006).
153
John Parry, Rights and Entitlements in the Community, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND
THE LAW, 607, 680, 683 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985).
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openly opposed the very existence of the organization they headed.154
One disability law expert characterized this campaign against the LSC as
typical of the Reagan Administration’s “sophisticated and steady attack
on the roots of the disability rights movement.”155
Other courses of action taken by the Reagan Administration similarly reflected a withdrawal of support for the mentally retarded and
other disabled persons. In 1981, for example, the Reagan-era Social Security Administration tried to terminate disability benefits for a significant number of legitimate recipients.156 In a 1984 Supreme Court case,
Grove City College v. Bell,157 President Reagan’s Secretary of Education
successfully argued for a narrow interpretation of the coverage provisions of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and other antidiscrimination statutes.158 Four years later, when Congress passed the
Civil Rights Restoration Act, which would have overturned the Court’s
ruling in Grove City and expanded the scope of civil rights protections,
President Reagan vetoed it.159 Finally, although the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 authorized the Attorney General to sue
state or local public officials where there was “a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment” of the federal rights of residents of staterun institutions,160 the Reagan-era Department of Justice exercised this
authority only twice on behalf of people with developmental disabilities.161
Many observers of the Supreme Court have contended that, in both
statutory and constitutional interpretation, the Court is responsive to the
preferences of the political branches of government.162 Yet one need not
speculate as to whether the Reagan Administration’s general lack of in154
Kimberly McKelvey, Comment, Public Interest Lawyering in the United States and Montana: Past, Present and Future, 67 MONT. L. REV. 337, 344 (2006).
155
STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 244 (1983).
156
Otis H. Stephens, Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and the Disabled, in THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 157, 170 (Tinsley E. Yarbrough ed., 1985).
157
Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
158
Otis H. Stephens, Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and the Disabled, in THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 157, 167 (Tinsley E. Yarbrough ed., 1985).
159
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). Congress
voted to override the President’s veto. See RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST
DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 25 (2005).
160
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1997-1997j (Westlaw 2010).
161
See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS
at
ACT:
HAS
IT
FULFILLED
ITS
PROMISE?,
app.
II
(2005),
available
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2005/ personsact.htm#appendixii.
162
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 549, 592 (2009); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 415 (1991).
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terest in the rights and needs of the mentally retarded affected the outcome of Cleburne. The Administration, represented by Solicitor General
Rex E. Lee, filed an amicus curiae brief in Cleburne in which it opposed
the recognition of mental retardation as a quasi-suspect classification.163
The Solicitor General began by noting that Congress and many state legislatures had exhibited increasing “solicitude for the special needs of
mentally retarded persons.”164 As examples of such legislation, he listed
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, the Education of the Handicapped Act, and a Texas state law165  the very same statutes that Justice White later cited in his opinion.166 Solicitor General Lee then argued
that legislatures may properly take mental retardation into account because “unlike members of racial minorities, mentally retarded individuals
are different from others in respect to their needs and capacities.”167 Although the mentally retarded deserve “concern and sympathy,”168 such
sentiments do not justify “creating yet another group enabled to compel
heightened scrutiny of legislative actions affecting their interests.”169
Ultimately, a majority of the Court agreed. Its slippery-slope argument referencing “the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm”170 echoed the Justice Department’s brief, which warned that any
special constitutional protections offered to the mentally retarded would
also have to be extended to “[the] physically handicapped, the infirm,
and even those suffering from diseases such as alcoholism.”171 Solicitor
General Lee took care to note that the Court could still “conclude that the
denial of a special-use permit in this case was so wanting in rationality as
to fail to pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”172 This, of course, was exactly the approach taken by the
Cleburne majority.173
163
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, City of Cleburne,
Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (No. 84-468).
164
Id. at 5.
165
Id. at 18-19.
166
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985) (majority
opinion).
167
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 8, City of Cleburne,
Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (No. 84-468).
168
Id. at 9.
169
Id.
170
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445-46.
171
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 21, City of Cleburne,
Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (No. 84-468).
172
Id. at 6.
173
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435.
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JUSTICE WHITE

The third factor influencing the majority opinion in Cleburne was
its author’s idiosyncratic method of deciding Fourteenth Amendment
cases. Justice White believed in giving the legislative and executive
branches wide latitude to make political judgments.174 However,
whether his credo was truly one of judicial restraint is called into question by his “activist” desire to provide guidance to the lower courts as
early as possible and his fondness for invalidating statutes under rationalbasis review.175 When viewed in the context of Justice White’s jurisprudence, then, Cleburne seems less an aberration and more a predictable
product of the Justice’s various analytical tics.
Justice White’s jurisprudence was characterized, above all else, by
deference to the political branches.176 Justice Stevens once observed,
“Of all the Justices with whom I have served, I remember Byron [White]
as the one who most consistently accorded a strong presumption of validity to the work of the Congress and the Executive.”177 Justice White explicitly articulated his code of judicial restraint in Bowers v. Hardwick,
where he wrote
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. . . . There
should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach
of [the Due Process] Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the
178
category of rights deemed to be fundamental.

Reflective of this restraint, Justice White refused to enlarge the
privileged circle of protected interests and classifications eliciting close
174
See Michael Herz, Nearest to Legitimacy: Justice White and Strict Rational Basis Scrutiny,
74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (2003); Jonathan D. Varat, Justice White and the Breadth and Allocation of Federal Authority, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 371, 372 (1987).
175
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1285
(2003); see also Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 502-07 (1965) (White, J., concurring) (while the
majority applied strict scrutiny to invalidate a statute prohibiting the use and distribution of contraceptives, Justice White would have invalidated the statute under minimal scrutiny); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 68 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); N.Y. City Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 609 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 27
(1985).
176
See Michael Herz, Nearest to Legitimacy: Justice White and Strict Rational Basis Scrutiny,
74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (2003); Jonathan D. Varat, Justice White and the Breadth and Allocation of Federal Authority, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 371, 372 (1987).
177
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1285
(2003).
178
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
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judicial review,179 especially because this circle had already expanded in
the years preceding Cleburne.180 Justice White was most comfortable
applying the rational-basis test, which minimized judicial interference
with legislative will.181 Even when he purported to apply strict scrutiny,
as in race cases, he actually engaged in an analysis similar to the beefedup rational-basis review seen in Cleburne.182
The notion that Justice White wanted to circumscribe the role of the
judiciary, however, is at odds with his eagerness in Cleburne to prematurely rule that mental retardation was not a quasi-suspect classification.
In this respect, a remark by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Justice White’s
replacement on the Court) may be illuminating; she once stated, “Byron
White was an ‘activist’ Justice only in his unswerving view that the
Court ought not let circuit splits linger, that it should say what the federal
law is sooner rather than later.”183 Thus, he issued fifty-four dissents
from denials of certiorari in the 1984 term, forty dissents in the 1985
term, and fifty-eight dissents in the 1992 term.184 Although the Fifth Circuit was the only federal appellate court to have ruled on the appropriate

179
See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195; Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 790 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that a woman’s ability to abort her
pregnancy is not a fundamental liberty interest and that restrictions on abortion should be subjected
to only “the most minimal judicial scrutiny”); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982)
(holding that alienage classifications, although subjected to heightened scrutiny when they primarily
affect economic interests, should receive less demanding scrutiny when they primarily serve a political function).
180
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding that discrimination against undocumented aliens “can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that sex-based classification must withstand intermediate-level scrutiny); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)
(applying “less than strictest” but not “toothless” scrutiny to statutory classification on the basis of
illegitimate birth).
181
See Allan Ides, The Jurisprudence of Justice Byron White, 103 YALE L.J. 419, 447 (1993).
182
Michael Herz, Nearest to Legitimacy: Justice White and Strict Rational Basis Scrutiny, 74
U. COLO. L. REV. 1329, 1366 (2003); see also Kate Stith, Byron R. White, Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 YALE L.J. 19, 30 (1993) (stating that Justice White also favored a sort of rational-basis
test in the context of criminal procedure, insisting that “the overriding command of the Fourth
Amendment is its inclusive ‘reasonableness’ requirement, not its more limited ‘warrant’ requirement.”).
183
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1285
(2003).
184
Michael J. Broyde, The Intercircuit Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts: An Analysis of Justice White’s Dissents from Denial of Certiorari During the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 610, 61214 (1987); Kate Stith, Byron R. White, Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 YALE L.J. 19, 23 n.26
(1993). For purposes of comparison, the Justices issued fewer than 300 such dissents with written
opinions between 1982 and 1987, an average of seven per Justice per year. Michael J. Broyde, The
Intercircuit Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts: An Analysis of Justice White’s Dissents from Denial
of Certiorari During the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 610, 613 n.12 (1987).
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level of scrutiny for classifications based on mental retardation,185 multiple district courts had addressed the issue and arrived at differing conclusions.186 In light of the surge of litigation over the rights of the mentally
retarded over the previous decade, Justice White probably should have
clarified the standard of review for the benefit of the lower courts.
Further contradicting Justice White’s reputation as a proponent of
judicial restraint is the fact that, while he proclaimed his loyalty to the
rational-basis test, the analysis he actually engaged in under the auspices
of this test often resembled intermediate scrutiny.187 Cleburne is emblematic of his penchant for striking down statutes under rational-basis
review. The first hint of this proclivity appeared in Justice White’s concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,188 a substantive due process
case. Whereas the majority found that marital privacy was a fundamental liberty interest triggering strict scrutiny, and that Connecticut’s statute
prohibiting the distribution and use of contraceptives unconstitutionally
infringed upon this interest, Justice White would have invalidated the
statute after only minimal scrutiny.189 Several years later, dissenting in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, Justice White
posited that reliance by the Texas school-financing system on local property taxation was irrational and therefore a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 190 In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, Justice
White, again in dissent, asserted that the New York City Transit Authority’s policy against employing methadone users violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was irrational and invidious.191 In Williams v.
Vermont, Justice White authored a majority opinion that held that Vermont’s use tax on automobiles purchased by out-of-staters who subse-

185
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Tex., 726 F.2d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1984),
rev’d, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
186
Compare Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 490 (D.N.D.
1982) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a classification discriminating against mentally retarded
persons), and Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 957-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (same) (dictum), with
N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
(holding that mental retardation is not a suspect classification), Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Ctr. v. Melton, 521 F. Supp. 365, 371 (D.N.H. 1981) (same), and Anderson v. Banks, 520 F.
Supp. 472, 512 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification).
187
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-07 (1965) (White, J., concurring);
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 68 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); N.Y. City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 609 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Williams v. Vermont.,
472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985).
188
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-07 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
189
Id. at 503-07.
190
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 68 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
191
N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 609 (1979) (White, J., dissenting).
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quently moved to Vermont had no legitimate purpose.192 Finally, Justice
White voted to strike down a state veterans’ preference law in Attorney
General of New York v. Soto-Lopez193 and a provision of the federal Food
Stamp Act in Lyng v. Castillo194 on the grounds that the classifications at
issue were irrational. This parade of cases “illustrate[s] Justice White’s
attachment to the rational-basis standard and his tendency to find that it
has been violated when other Justices reach the conclusion of unconstitutionality, if at all, only through some form of heightened scrutiny.”195
In sum, the Cleburne opinion exemplifies the push and pull of Justice White’s deferential and activist impulses. Justice White consistently
held that minimal scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review in
Fourteenth Amendment cases, and Cleburne was no exception.196 He
also preferred to set bright-line rules for the lower courts to apply,197 so
in Cleburne he announced, unnecessarily, that classifications based on
mental retardation did not deserve heightened scrutiny. Finally, Cleburne was only one in a long line of Justice White’s opinions to hold a
statute invalid under rational-basis review.198 If the task of writing the
Court’s opinion in Cleburne had been assigned to a different Justice, the
course of history for Americans with mental retardation might have
changed completely.
CONCLUSION: CLEBURNE’S LEGACY
The Cleburne litigation and decision appear to have spurred some
beneficial legislative changes for mentally retarded individuals. Shortly
before the Supreme Court handed down its ruling, Texas passed a law
that permitted community-based residences housing up to six disabled
persons to set up in any residential district in any city,199 and the Cle192

Williams v. Vermont., 472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985).
Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 916 (1986) (White, J., concurring).
194
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 643 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
195
Michael Herz, Nearest to Legitimacy: Justice White and Strict Rational Basis Scrutiny, 74
U. COLO. L. REV. 1329, 1365-66 (2003).
196
See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 790 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Cabell v. ChavezSalido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982).
197
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1285
(2003).
198
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-07 (1965) (White, J., concurring);
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 68 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); N.Y. City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 609 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Williams v. Vermont.,
472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985); Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 916 (1986) (White, J.,
concurring); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 643 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
199
Community Homes for Disabled Persons Location Act, TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 123
193
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burne municipal code was amended accordingly.200 At some point, the
city also deleted the antiquated reference to the “feeble-minded” from its
code.201 On the national level, Cleburne was understood to “put cities on
notice that they need clear, rational reasons if they want to treat group
homes for the developmentally disabled . . . differently from other residential uses.”202 The decision also “helped create some momentum to
amend the Fair Housing Act to prohibit disability discrimination in housing,”203 a change that occurred in 1988.204
On the whole, however, Cleburne did little to enhance the status of
mentally retarded persons — or persons with disabilities in general205 —
in American society. The courts have relied on Cleburne to uphold, inter
alia, a statute allowing for the indefinite commitment of persons with
mental retardation,206 a workers’ compensation scheme that denied permanent partial disability benefits to claimants who sustained severe skin
damage on the job,207 a policy excluding persons with Alzheimer’srelated dementia from a veteran’s home,208 a welfare program that placed
a one-year limit on benefits to disabled persons while providing openended benefits to all other recipients,209 and the use of peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors because of their disabilities.210
Justice Marshall’s prediction that the Cleburne analysis would confuse the lower courts came true in the years immediately following the
decision.211 In 1987, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit as(Westlaw 2001).
200
CITY OF CLEBURNE, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 155.30-31 (2009).
201
See id.
202
Am. Planning Ass’n, Homes for the Developmentally Disabled, ZONING NEWS 1 (Jan.
1986); see also James T. Hogan, Comment, Community Housing Rights for the Mentally Retarded,
1987 DET. C. L. REV. 869, 919 (1987) (“Absent carefully crafted wording, most ordinances would
probably be invalidated under the Cleburne test.”).
203
RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 14 (2005).
204
See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604
(Westlaw 2010).
205
Cleburne’s holding is commonly interpreted to apply to all forms of disability, not only
mental retardation. See, e.g., Matthew D. Taggart, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
After Garrett: Defective Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity and Its Remedial Impact, 91 CALIF. L.
REV. 837, 841 n.71 (2003) (“Cleburne clearly stands for the proposition that the disabled are a nonsuspect class and disability discrimination claims are subject only to ‘rational basis’ review . . . .”).
206
In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Minn. 1986).
207
Barton v. Ducci Elec. Contractors, Inc., 730 A.2d 1149, 1165 (Conn. 1999).
208
Estate of Martin v. Cal. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 560 F.3d 1042, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2009).
209
Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1996).
210
United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870, 876 (7th Cir. 1999).
211
See generally Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 617-19 (2000) (quoting cases that interpreted
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sumed that a “second order” rational-basis test was the appropriate standard for reviewing the exclusion of mentally impaired and developmentally disabled persons from a federally funded housing project.212 Many
federal district courts, too, believed that Cleburne endorsed a more stringent form of rational-basis review and that equal protection doctrine was
in upheaval.213
However, this confusion was short-lived, as was any possibility that
the courts would meaningfully scrutinize classifications based on mental
retardation. In Heller v. Doe,214 handed down in 1993, the Supreme
Court used a traditional, deferential rational-basis test to analyze a statutory scheme governing the involuntary commitment of mentally disabled
persons to state institutions.215 The majority disclaimed ever “purport[ing] to apply a different standard of rational basis review” in a case
involving the mentally retarded.216 Justice David Souter, dissenting,
wrote, “While the Court cites Cleburne once, and does not purport to
overrule it, neither does the Court apply it, and at the end of the day Cleburne’s status is left uncertain.”217 After Heller, review of legislative
distinctions based on mental disability once again became “tantamount to
no review at all.”218
Ironically, given the Cleburne majority’s emphasis on congressional
sensitivity to the needs of the mentally retarded, the Court’s premature
rejection of intermediate scrutiny in Cleburne ultimately curtailed Congress’s power to protect individuals with disabilities. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,219 the Court declined to reconsider its holding in Cleburne that classifications based on disability
were constitutional as long as they were rational.220 Because Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act required state employers to accommodate disabled employees even when their refusal to provide such accommodations would be fiscally rational, the Court ruled that Congress
had exceeded its constitutional authority.221
Cleburne as requiring a more rigorous type of scrutiny than traditional rational-basis review).
212
Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343, 1354-55 (10th Cir. 1987).
213
See, e.g., Burstyn v. Miami Beach, 663 F. Supp. 528, 533 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Long Island
Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 409-10 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F.
Supp. 983, 988-990 (D. Kan. 1985).
214
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
215
Id. at 319-321.
216
Id. at 321.
217
Id. at 337 (Souter, J., dissenting).
218
FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 323 n.3 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring).
219
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
220
Id. at 367.
221
Id. at 372-74. A string of other Supreme Court decisions at the turn of the century whittled
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In short, although Cleburne was a nominal victory for the operators
and inhabitants of group homes, its legacy is one of anemic constitutional
and statutory protections for the mentally retarded and other disabled individuals. In this legal landscape, government-sanctioned prejudice
against mentally retarded persons has endured. As this Article went to
print, eight state constitutions still deny voting rights to “idiots”  or
people deemed mentally incompetent or thought to lack the capacity to
understand222  and as recently as 2007, election laws in twenty-two
states disqualified voters based on some mental-status criteria.223 Many
states “link mental disability to a present and future inability to care for a
child,” thus opening the door to the (ostensibly discriminatory) termination of parental rights on the basis of disability.224 Additionally, several
states prohibit persons with mental disabilities,225 sometimes termed
“imbecile[s],”226 from marrying. Finally, in at least one jurisdiction,
once a mentally retarded person is involuntarily committed to an institution, he or she may never have an opportunity to be heard in court
again.227 These and other provisions of state law that unfairly disadvantage people with mental retardation might not be on the books today if
the Cleburne Court had expressly applied the robust form of scrutiny
down the coverage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and arguably betrayed the
Court’s continuing aversion to protecting disabled persons from discrimination. See Toyota Motor
Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (setting a very high standard for demonstrating a substantial limitation in the major life activity of performing manual tasks); Albertson’s, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566-567 (1999) (holding that a plaintiff who was blind in one eye was
not necessarily “disabled” under the ADA); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521,
525 (1999) (holding that the defendant did not discriminate on the basis of disability when it fired an
employee because of his high blood pressure); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 48889 (1999) (holding that two sisters who were not hired as pilots due to their severe myopia were not
“disabled” under the ADA because they had 20/20 vision with corrective lenses). The ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008), overturned these decisions in
large part.
222
IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5; KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; MISS.
CONST. art. XII, § 241; NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (amended 2005); N.J. CONST. art. II, § 1, para. 6 ;
N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6.
223
See Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote:
The Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 940 (2007).
224
Dale Margolin, No Chance to Prove Themselves: The Rights of Mentally Disabled Parents
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and State Law, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 112, 160
(2007); see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7826 (Westlaw 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-94 (Westlaw
2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103 (Westlaw 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.106 (Westlaw
2010).
225
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.990(2) (Westlaw 2010).
226
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-109 (Westlaw 2010).
227
Laura W. Harper, Comment, Involuntary Commitment of People with Mental Retardation:
Ensuring All of Georgia’s Citizens Receive Adequate Procedural Due Process, 58 MERCER L. REV.
711, 718, 726 (2007) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 37-4-2 (Westlaw 2010)).
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that, as other critics have argued, such classifications warrant. Cleburne
was “wrong the day it was decided”228 and is just as wrong today. It
should be overturned.

228
Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (referring to Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
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